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BEAR MARKET LITIGATION: SHOWING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT LITIGATION AND A
DOWN ECONOMY
IMAN LORDGOOEI*
The granting [of] patents "inflames cupidity," excites fraud,
stimulates men to run after schemes that may enable them
to levy a tax on the public, begets disputes and quarrels be-
twixt inventors, provokes endless lawsuits .... The princi-
ple of the law from which such consequences flow cannot
be just.
- The Economist, 1851
1. INTRODUCTION
Through the course of the industrial revolution in the early
twentieth century and the dawn of the information age in the late
twentieth century, intellectual property ("IP"') rights have been
championed as a driver of personal and national economic wealth
creation.' The basis for correlating IP rights with wealth creation
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; B.S. Electrical
Engineering, 2004, Drexel University. I wish to thank Elnaz Famam for her invaluable
suggestions throughout my work on this Comment, as well as the Editorial Board of the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law for all their hard work
in preparing this Comment for publication.
1 See generally KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH 17 (2002) (citing intellectual property as a tool for economic
development and wealth creation); cf. Jason 0. Watson, A History of the United
States Patent Office, Apr. 17, 2001, available at http://www.historical-markers.org/
usptohistory.cgi (providing a history of patent rights leading to the creation of the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office).
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follows from the belief that: (1) IP rights encourage technological
innovation;2 and (2) such technological innovation encourages in-
creased productivity and wealth creation.
3
Accordingly, the public value of IP has led to the development
of varying property rights granted by the governments of the
world as a way to increase national wealth and protect domestic
industries by granting short-term "monopolies" or, more precisely,
rights to exclude. Though there has been some push to harmonize
IP rights across various jurisdictions of the world,4 international
differences still remain in the administration of IP and, in particu-
lar, patent rights. These international differences generate varying
levels of patent activity across jurisdictions, which in turn contrib-
ute to a divergence in both corporate IP strategy and economic im-
pact within jurisdictions. For example, a patent in the United
States has arguably greater value than it does in Europe, thereby
encouraging an increased use of patent litigation as a way for U.S.
companies to recoup economic losses during a downturn in the
economy or their market sector.
1.1. The Public Value of Patent Activity
There are several factors to consider in determining the value
of increased patent activity for a nation. These factors include: (1)
whether the increased patent activity induces technological ad-
vancements that lead to the creation of national economic wealth;
5
(2) the point at which patent thickets serve as a hindrance to tech-
2 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (recognizing the correlation between IP rights
and innovation by giving Congress the power to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries").
3 See, e.g., The New "New" Economy, ECONOMIST, Sep. 13, 2003, at 61-64 (noting
a correlation between "impressive" increases in American productivity with the
development of new information technologies); IDRIS, supra note 1, at 24 (discuss-
ing intellectual property as a tool for economic development and wealth crea-
tion).
4 For the purposes of this comment, the United States and the European Un-
ion ("EU") are the relevant jurisdictions. See, e.g., Michael D. Kaminski, Patent
Harmonization, MOD. DRUG DISCOVERY, Jan. 2001, at 36-37, available at http://pubs.
acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/vO4/iOl/html/patents.html (describing patent
harmonization efforts).
5 Capital and labor market efficiencies are arguably high enough in today's
economy that real economic growth and concomitant wealth creation will primar-
ily only come from the development and adoption of new technologies. See, e.g.,
The New "New" Economy, supra note 3, at 61 (citing new information technologies
as the source of economic growth in the United States).
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nological advancement;6 and (3) the extent to which corporate re-
search and development ("R&D") is affected by IP rights as op-
posed to market demand and/or regular advancements in science. 7
Two phenomena may be observed. First, an increase in eco-
nomic strength of an industry or nation may be observed as arising
from increased innovation, where some threshold level of patent
filings or litigation is not exceeded (i.e., too much patent activity
may create "patent thickets," arguably hindering innovation)8
Given the presumption that increased patent activity results in
more innovation, then increased patent activity may also result in
an economically stronger industry, so long as the patents are not
being misused.9 Similarly, a nation's economic strength should
grow with increased patent activity; otherwise, the national policy
justification for promoting strong IP rights is irrational. 10 The sec-
ond phenomenon is that an economic downturn in an industry
under certain conditions (e.g., where the downturn is not due to
certain exogenous factors such as terrorism, pandemic, etc.), would
presumably lead to an increased demand for innovation and thus
precipitate increased patent activity, whether in filings or litigation
(but particularly litigation).11
6 See, e.g., George Leopold, Patent Litigation Crimps Standards-Setting Efforts,
ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, July 23, 2001, at 22 (citing increased patent litiga-
tion as a cause of greater difficulty in operating technology standardization
groups).
7 By "regular advancements in science," I am referring to the advancements
generated by government and publicly funded research.
8 See, e.g., Patently Absurd?, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001, at 41 (describing the
"Tragedy of the Anti-Commons," where many property owners have to grant
permission before a resource may be used, as a hindrance to continued innova-
tion).
9 Id.
10 Or unwise, at least, considering that individual firms and industries may
lobby heavily for stronger intellectual property rights that are in their best inter-
ests but not necessarily in the nation's best interests.
11 It can cost anywhere from eight to fifteen thousand dollars and two to five
years to obtain a single patent; even then, a patent portfolio has no inherent value
by itself. Rather, value is derived from licensing and litigation, and returns are
not reaped immediately. See, e.g., Pierce Atwood: Attorneys at Law, Overview of
Patents and the Patent Process (2003), available at http://www.pierceatwood.com/A
rticles/63_Patentprocessoverview.pdf (citing the costs of procuring a patent in the
United States). On the other hand, litigating a patent can cost millions of dollars,
but the returns are high and relatively immediate- even though a patent trial may
take years until resolution. One would expect, nevertheless, that litigation would
trump procurement in bad economic times, since the potential returns on litiga-
tion appear more immediate and will presumably keep shareholders at bay dur-
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Some scholars have questioned the veracity of whether IP
rights encourage technological innovation or if they actually hinder
it.12 Studies indicate, however, that IP rights do encourage techno-
logical innovation.13
Accordingly, nations are incentivized not only to protect their
domestic industry and economy, but also to position themselves at
the forefront of technology by providing strong IP rights to attract
corporate investment in domestic R&D.'
4
This strengthening of IP rights has arguably led to the in-
creased procurement and litigation of patents, particularly in the
United States.' 5 While some argue that this increase in patent ac-
tivity is a hindrance to the creation of new technologies, 16 and thus
economic wealth, Schumpeterian theorists will nevertheless claim
that the micro-monopolies of patents are necessary for the ad-
vancement of innovation and should consequently be protected by
increased litigation.'
7
ing a corporate downturn. See Julia Huston, Litigating Patent Rights in a Down
Economy, 32 MASS. LAW. WKLY 359, 359 (2003) (finding that "companies are invest-
ing more financial resources in patent litigation than ever before," despite a down-
turn in the economy).
12 See, e.g., Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protec-
tion Spur Technological Change?, 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 235, 235 (2003) (address-
ing whether IP rights incentivize technological innovation).
13 This is not such a strange proposition, since IP rights inherently stem from
the idea that providing protection to inventions from piracy encourages inventors
to invest in and disclose new technologies. See MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10-23 (3rd ed. 2003) (discussing eco-
nomic incentive rationale for IP "monopoly" rights); cf. Kanwar & Evenson, supra
note 12, at 258 (finding that there is "evidence to support the claim that... intel-
lectual property protection [has] a strong positive influence on R&D investment").
14 But see GRAHAM R. MITCHELL, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., THE GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR
U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY 10 (1997) (citing public investment in grants, fellowships,
etc., by the government, rather than strong IP rights, as having "contributed sig-
nificantly to U.S. technological leadership").
15 See, e.g., Patently Absurd, supra note 8, at 40 ("Between 1982 and 1992, the
number of patents issued each year in America doubled from 55,000 to almost
110,000.").
16 See Leopold, supra note 6 (discussing rising patent litigation as a hindrance
to industry trade groups).
17 See generally Leonard I. Nakamura, Economics and the New Economy: The In-
visible Hand Meets Creative Destruction, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV.,
July/Aug. 2000, at 19-23, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/br/bja
001n.pdf (describing Schumpeter's theory that so-called "creative destruction"
leads to technological innovation).
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1.2. The Increasingly International Nature of Patent Protection
The issue of jurisdictional differences in patent protection has
also come to the forefront in recent years, with numerous parties
calling for the standardization of patent laws in order to harmonize
territorial idiosyncrasies in IP rights.'8 The rationale for harmoni-
zation follows from the fact that the development of new informa-
tion technologies and the Internet have reduced the cost of infor-
mation exchange to practically zero.19 Accordingly, it has become
easier to obtain and distribute a host nation's domestically pat-
ented inventions in a foreign jurisdiction, thereby allowing the for-
eign jurisdiction to reap the rewards of technological advance-
ments developed with the host nation's domestic public spending,
and without sharing any of the costs. Nations, therefore, are incen-
tivized to seek patent cooperation treaties with major overseas
markets so that domestic patents and technologies (i.e., those de-
veloped in the host nation or through public domestic spending by
the host nation) are given similar protection in important foreign
markets as they are given domestically.
20
18 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h2795.pdf (proposing,
among other things, a change in the traditional U.S. first-to-invent mode of de-
termining priority of invention to a first-to-file mode followed by the EU and oth-
ers).
19 See, e.g., BRIAN S. WESBURY, THE NEW ERA OF WEALTH: How INVESTORS CAN
PROFIT FROM THE 5 ECONOMIC TRENDS SHAPING THE FUTURE 21 (2002) ("The net-
worked economy is reducing the cost of information while increasing its value.").
20 See, e.g., Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London- Local Interna-
tionalism: How Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with
Europe, the United States, and the Rest of the World, 2 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 31, 47
(2004):
Another aspect of international patent law rests on the TRIPs agreements
that came into force with the accession of many countries to the WTO in
1994. The Uruguay round of WTO negotiations introduced TRIPs into
GATT and bravely attempted to harmonize global patent systems with
uniform standards of protection. However, TRIPs provisions are not di-
rectly enforceable by patentees; the provisions merely impose an obliga-
tion upon member nations to enact legislation enforcing required rights.
Both the U.S. and the U.K. have made changes to their laws in response
to these provisions (e.g., on bringing the term of patents to twenty years
from the time of filing of an application).
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1.3. Patent Protection in the United States Compared to the European
Union ("EU")
In the United States, patent applications are handled by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), where examiners
operate according to administrative guidelines and regulations set
forth in the Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure
("MPEP").21 Notable features of patent procurement in the United
States include the first-to-invent mode of determining priority of
inventorship (i.e., when one or more patentees are attempting to
obtain patent rights on the same invention), whereby inventors
who can show that they were the first to invent are given patent
rights to their inventions, so long as, inter alia, they have not
"abandoned, suppressed, or concealed [their invention]. "22 The
U.S. courts and legislature have also been quite liberal in granting
patents to inventions in a wide variety of subject matter, 23 such as
computer software, 24 business methods, 25 and genetically engi-
neered organisms.2 6 The European Patent Office ("EPO") was es-
tablished to harmonize patent protection across Europe, and it
handles the applications for many European nations including, in-
ter alia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. 27 Applicants are allowed to file their patents with the
21 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 522,
536 n.7 (D.N.J. 2000) ("While the MPEP does not have the force of law, it is enti-
tled to judicial notice as an official interpretation of statutes or regulations as long
as it is not in conflict therewith.").
22 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g)(1)-(2) (2000).
23 The U.S. Congress has enacted legislation that defines patentable subject
matter as constituting "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. §
101 (2000).
24 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (allowing a patent on a
process, even though the process made use of a mathematical algorithm and a
programmed digital computer).
25 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (permitting a patent on a process incorporating a mathemati-
cal algorithm with a result expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, percentage,
cost, or loss).
26 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (allowing a pat-
ent on a genetically engineered micro-organism under the language of 35 U.S.C. §
101).
27 See, e.g., Daiske Yoshida, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Foreign Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 225 (1997)
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EPO in English, French, or German, and all granted patents are en-
forceable within any designated contracting member nations.
28
In contrast to the USPTO, the EPO does not formally provide
patent protection for software programs or business methods.
29
The EPO also does not allow patents on plant or animal varieties)
g0
Furthermore, the EPO follows a first-to-file practice of determining
priority of inventorship.31 Moreover, the cost of procuring a Euro-
pean patent is much higher than obtaining the same patent in the
United States. 32 Another notable difference between the EPO and
USPTO is that the EPO allows only one claim of each type in any
given application (e.g., a method or apparatus), whereas the
USPTO allows any number of claims or claim types, so long as the
invention being claimed is unified across those claims (i.e., there is
only one invention being claimed). This difference in the number
of claims allowed may spur applicants to file multiple patent ap-
plications to protect an invention in Europe, whereas a single ap-
plication may be able to include all of those claims in the United
States.
Since the USPTO allows a broader range of patents at a lower
cost than the EPO, patent protection is arguably stronger in the
(listing all contracting states to the 1977 European Patent Convention).
28 Id.
29 See EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, art. 52, October 5, 1973, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.htm (excluding from
patentability "schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers"). But see Kerem Kaya,
European Council Approves Software Patents, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, July 9,
2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jul2OO4/pnts-jO9.shtml (describing a
new EU proposal to make computer software patentable, and also pointing out
that the EPO "has been granting software patents since 1998 in a violation of pat-
ent laws under which the EPO itself was established").
30 See EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, supra note 29, art. 53, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar53.html (excluding from
patentability "plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological
processes or the products thereof").
31 Id. art. 60 § 2, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/ep
c/e/ar60.html (giving the right to a European patent to the inventor with the ear-
liest filing date).
32 See, e.g., J. Douglas Hawkins, Importance and Access of International Patent
Protection for the Independent Inventor, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 150 (1995)
("A more recent study conducted by the European Patent Office estimated that
filing a European Patent alone costs applicants over $31,000."). But see Pierce At-
wood: Attorneys at Law, supra note 11 (claiming the cost of procuring a U.S. pat-
ent is only as high as $15,000).
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United States than in the EU. However, the quality of the EPO and
USPTO's operating procedures should also factor into the analysis.
It is therefore interesting to note that in fiscal year 2003 ("FY2003"),
the EPO experienced total expenditures of £883 million (approxi-
mately $1.08 billion) with revenues of E878 million (approximately
$1.07 billion),33 whereas the USPTO experienced total patent-
related expenditures of $1.07 billion with patent-related revenues
of $1.00 billion.34 By the end of FY2003, the EPO had a staff of
5,809, 35 whereas the USPTO had a staff of 5,081 dedicated to pat-
ents.36 The USPTO, therefore, expended approximately $211,000
per examiner in FY2003, whereas the EPO only expended ap-
proximately $186,000. The $25,000 more spent per patent examiner
by the USPTO may imply a greater quality of patent examination,
leading to higher quality patents.37
1.4. Patent Activity in the United States Compared to the EU
Patenting activities in the EU from 1996 to 2003 have generally
been quite different from those in the United States. The disparity
is most likely a result of the differences in the markets for goods
and services in the EU versus the United States, but at least some of
the difference in activity should be attributed to the jurisdictional
differences in patent law and practice, discussed above. Some of
these differences - as obtained from the 2003 Trilateral Statistical
Report produced jointly by the EPO, USPTO, and Japan Patent Of-
fice ("JPO") - are discussed below.
1.4.1. Patent procurement activities
From the years 1996 to 2003, the USPTO has consistently out-
paced the EPO in terms of the number of utility patent applications
filed (see Table 1 below), indicating a perceived strength of the U.S.
patent system versus the European patent system. This perceived
33 European Patent Office, Japan Patent Office & United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office, Trilateral Statistical Report 9-10 (2003 ed.) (on file with author) [herein-
after Trilateral Statistical Report].
34 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Results of Operations (2003), avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/040602_resul
ts-of op.html.
35 Trilateral Statistical Report, supra note 33, at 10.
36 Id. at 19.
37 Admittedly, the increased expenditures may be a result of increased ad-
ministrative costs in the United States versus Europe.
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strength is underscored by the fact that the number of patents
originating in EU states (i.e., those with applicants residing within
the EU) that are filed in the EPO are approximately equal to the
number of EU-originating patents filed in the USPTO (i.e., most
European patentees will file their applications in the USPTO as
well as the EPO), whereas the number of patents originating in the
United States that are filed in the USPTO greatly outnumber the
same number that are filed in the EPO (i.e., most American patent-
ees will not seek protection with a European patent).
TABLE 1. TOTAL UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EU BASED ON ORIGINATING JURISDICTION, FROM
1996-2003.38
Office Origin 1996 1997 1998 1999
EPO EU 31,490 36,510 41,190 45,028
U.S. 18,638 20,497 23,502 25,393
USPTO EU 31,230 33,249 35,809 44,660
U.S. 106,892 120,445 135,742 149,825
2000 2001 2002 2003
EPO EU 49,785 53,737 53,475 58,255
U.S. 28,488 30,450 30,213 31,863
USPTO EU 44,750 50,607 52,621 49,762
U.S. 163,699 174,709 184,245 188,941
The disparity in strength of a U.S. patent versus that of an EU
patent is further evidenced by the number of patents that are
abandoned at the end of each year from issuance. In the United
States, more than thirty-five percent of patents are kept alive for
the entire twenty-year term.39 In Europe, on the other hand, only
about ten percent of patents are kept alive for their entire twenty-
year term.40 Furthermore, there is more of a sharp decline in patent
maintenance in Europe versus the United States (see Figure 2, be-
low). The lower level of patent maintenance in the EU versus the
38 Trilateral Statistical Report, supra note 33, at Statistical Annex.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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United States also implies that the value of a patent in the United
States is greater than a patent in Europe; otherwise, patentees
would not let their patents become abandoned.
FIGURE 1. TOTAL UTILITY PATENT FILINGS BY YEAR.
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FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PATENTS MAINTAINED AT THE END OF
EACH PATENT YEAR.
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1.4.2. Patent litigation activities
Given the disparity of patent filings in the EU versus the
United States, one would expect a similar gap with respect to pat-
ent litigation in the two jurisdictions. Some studies indicate that
patent litigation in the EU comprises roughly 600 cases filed per
year;43 certain other studies have shown that 462 patent cases were
tried in Germany (The Federal Patent Court) from 1983 to 1997,44
129 in the Netherlands (the Hague Courts) from 1993 to 1997, 45 and
only 61 in France from 1986 to 1997.46
After running a search for patent cases in the LEXIS Federal
42 Id.
43 See Joseph Straus, Patent Litigation in Europe -A Glimmer of Hope? Present
Status and Future Perspectives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 403, 408 (2000) ("A very
rough, unofficial estimate by the EPO is that some 600 court actions are filed per
year in the Contracting States that have in issue the validity or infringement of
European patents.")
44 Id. at 407-08.
45 Id. at 408.
46 Id.
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District Courts database, it was found that the United States clearly
did trump the EU for the number of patent cases decided per year,
which (for the purposes of this Comment) I will assume corre-
sponds to the number filed per year. In particular, from 1983 to
1997, approximately 1,900 patent cases were decided in the United
States 47 versus the 462 filed in Germany; from 1993 to 1997, ap-
proximately 700 patent cases were decided in the United States
48
versus the 129 filed in the Netherlands; and from 1986 to 1997, ap-
proximately 1,600 patent cases were decided in the United States
49
versus the 61 filed in France. In fact, the Federal District Courts of
Delaware, alone, tried more patent cases from 1986 to 1997 than
did the French courts (95 in the Deleware versus 61 in France).
Data found on LEXIS for the number of patent cases decided in the
U.S. Federal District Courts is present below in Figure 3 for the
years 1996 to 2003.
47 This data was obtained by a search on LEXIS performed on Jan. 22, 2006
for federal district court cases involving the assertion of patents. It was further
found that the U.S. states that tried the most patent cases in this time period in-
cluded California (204), Delaware (122), Illinois (323), New York (248), and Penn-
sylvania (131).
48 This data was obtained by a search on LEXIS performed on Jan. 22, 2006
for federal district court cases involving the assertion of patents. It was further
found that the U.S. states that tried the most patent cases in this time period in-
cluded California (110), Delaware (39), Illinois (118), New York (85), and Pennsyl-
vania (42).
49 This data was obtained by a search on LEXIS performed on Jan. 22, 2006
for federal district court cases involving the assertion of patents. It was further
found that the U.S. states that tried the most patent cases in this time period in-
cluded California (193), Delaware (95), Illinois (278), New York (209), and Penn-
sylvania (108).
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FIGURE 3. PATENT CASES DECIDED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1996 TO 2003.50
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1.5. Economic Activity in the United States Compared to the EU
Given the rise in patent procurement and litigation in the
United States from 1996 to 2003, one would expect to see a con-
comitant increase in the state of the national economy, as well as in
the corporate profits of patent-intensive companies, such as high
technology and semiconductor firms. Accordingly, plots of the
U.S. Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") and corporate profits by in-
dustry are presented (see Figures 4-7, below).
500 *1~
1995
50 This data was obtained by a search on LEXIS performed on Jan. 22, 2006
for federal district court cases involving the assertion of patents.
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FIGURE 4. U.S. GDP (IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FROM 1996 TO 2003.51
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51 Data obtained from the U.S. DEP'T OF CoM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S.
ECONOMIc AccouNTs (released Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.bea.gov/
bea/ dn/ home/ gdp.htm.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss4/4
2006] PATENT LITIGATION INA DOWN ECONOMY 1091
FIGURE 5. U.S. GROSS OUTPUT BY INDUSTRY (IN BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS) FROM 1996 TO 2003.52
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FIGURE 6. U.S. GROSS OUTPUT FOR MANUFACTURING AND IT-
INTENSIVE INDUSTRY (IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FROM 1996 TO
2003.53
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FIGURE 7. U.S. TOTAL CORPORATE PROFITS FOR DOMESTIC
INDUSTRIES AND TECH-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES (IN BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS) FROM 1996 TO 2003.5
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As shown in Figure 7, the profitability of the U.S. technology
industry fell sharply from 1999 to 2001, at which point it began to
recover.55 Figures 4 through 6 also show an inflection point around
2001, when GDP and gross output for several industries took a hit,
presumably due to the "dot com bust."56 A correlation exists with
the patent litigation statistics illustrated in Figure 3, which shows a
sharp rise in litigation from 2000 to 2002, as companies presumably
sought to recoup losses from the "dot com bust" by litigating their
patent portfolios.57 Also, the sharp rise in patent litigation ob-
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Michael Chait, Is the Dot Corn Bust Coming to an End?, July 8, 2002,
available at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/1381331 (last
visited Dec. 6, 2006) (describing the dot-corn bust as well as the recovery in 2002);
cf Wikipedia, Dot-corn bubble, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dot-
com bubble (last visited Dec. 6, 2006) (describing the events leading up to the de-
velopment and bust of the dot com bubble).
57 One would expect there to be a lag time between the fall in profitability
and the decision to litigate more patents; since the data shown in Figure 3 is for
patent cases decided (not filed), one would expect that there is no correlation to
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served in Figure 3 appears to taper off between 2002 and 2003 in
light of the recovery during that same time period, as observed in
Figure 7.58 Patent applications in the United States rose during the
same period.
59
Similar data was not found for the EU, but suffice it to say that
the litigation of patents in the EU during the observed time period
was so sparse60 that there would be very little statistical relevance
between any rise or fall in litigation and the overall state of the
economy or an industry. Furthermore, during the same period,
European telecommunications companies suffered heavy losses
due to exorbitant fees paid to obtain licenses for spectrum to oper-
ate 3G wireless networks.61 These telecommunications companies
were primarily service providers, 62 not product developers, 63 and
thus likely did not even have adequate patent portfolios that could
be litigated in order to recoup losses. Nevertheless, there are indi-
cations that at least some of these service providers looked to their
patent portfolios as a source of possible income in order to recoup
losses, such as those from the 3G spectrum auction bust for exam-
ple.
64
the loss of profitability since presumably the decision to litigate came before such
losses. However, the losses in profitability were only made public on the dates
shown, and corporate managers would have known of such losses prior to the
publication of such data. At least temporally, therefore, there is logically a corre-
lation between the sharp drop in profitability in the technology industry and the
concomitant rise in patent litigation.
58 Furthermore, the number of patent cases decided in 2004 was found to be
956, further bolstering the tapering off of patent litigation in Figure 3.
59 See supra Figure 1.
60 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Beyond the Bubble, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2003 (describing the enor-
mous failure of the European 3G auction, as companies paid exorbitant sums to
obtain spectrum rights for an over-hyped technology).
62 Examples of service providers include British Telecom ("BT"), Vodafone,
Deutsche Telekom, etc.
63 Examples of product developers include Cisco Systems, Nokia, Ericsson,
etc.
64 For example, BT looked to its patent portfolio of 14,000 patents around the
time of the telecoms bust in order to identify valuable patents that could be li-
censed or litigated. See, e.g., Britain's BT and Patents, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2002,
available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story-id=E1JQDJGP
(describing BT's push to identify value in its patent portfolio in order to develop a
patent licensing strategy).
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1.6. Preliminary Conclusions
A few conclusions may be drawn from the findings above: (1)
patent procurement in the United States, as well as the EU, is on
the rise, but the number of patent filings in the USPTO are greater
than those filed in the EPO, without any indication that filings in
the EPO are going to reach U.S. levels anytime in the near future;65
(2) the disparity in patent filings in the United States versus the EU
may be explained by, among other things, 66 the high cost of patent-
ing in the EU,67 as well as the narrower scope of patentable subject
matter in the EU;68 (3) patent litigation in the United States is on the
rise and currently exceeds the number of cases filed in the EU,6 9
though some commentators predict that the EU may be able to
catch up;70 and (4) the decision to litigate patents in the United
States (and probably in Europe as well)71 is affected by the state of
the national economy and, more closely, the corporate profits in
patent-heavy sectors such as the technology sector.72
The increases in patent procurement observed in conclusion 1
may be explained by noting that corporate strategy is increasingly
focused on patent procurement and portfolio management.73 Even
65 See supra Figure 1.
66 Though they were not researched, other factors affecting the disparity in
patentability could conceivably include a smaller market for patented/patentable
goods and services in the EU, a more negative public perception of patents and
intellectual property rights in the EU versus the United States, and/or traditional
modes of business in the EU, which may not have focused heavily on intellectual
property rights as a source of income.
67 See Hawkins, supra note 32.
68 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Straus, supra note 43, at 427-28 (explaining that there may be a
"glimmer of hope" that the EU will form a unified court of patent appeals, similar
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to "get an integrated
system for litigating European patents").
71 Cf. Britain's BT and Patents, supra note 64 (indicating that BT has begun to
identify key patents in its portfolio so that it may license them; there is also the
implication of increased patent litigation).
72 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text; see also Huston, supra note 11.
73 As recently explained in the Economist:
IBM alone now earns over $1 billion annually from its intellectual-
property portfolio. HP's revenue from licensing has quadrupled in less
than three years, to over $200m this year. Microsoft is on course to file
3,000 patents this year, when in 1990 it received a mere five. Earlier this
year it set up an entirely new corporate division to exchange its technol-
ogy for cash or equity in start-up firms. Nokia has recently started li-
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if a company has no intention of licensing or asserting its IP against
competitors, it will nevertheless patent its inventions, when possi-
ble.74 Furthermore, the increase in U.S. patent litigation may be at
least partly explained by the increasingly high damages75 awarded
against patent infringers, 76 though some of these awards are re-
versed on appeal.
77
2. EFFECTS ON MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING
While not within the scope of this Comment, a model may be
developed to more specifically predict corporate managerial be-
havior with respect to patent portfolio management depending on
the state of the national economy, or, more appropriately, the eco-
nomic state of a particular industry.78
Just as a downturn in the industry promotes increased patent
litigation as a way to recoup losses, 79 an upturn in the market ar-
censing its technology to other firms and plans to do more. And some
companies, such as ARM, a British firm that designs the blueprints for
microchips used in wireless devices, do little other than create and sell
intellectual property.
A Market for Ideas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://www.economist.co
m/displaystory.cfm?story-id=ElVDTQJJD.
74 Id. A Market for Ideas states further that:
Companies cannot simply turn their back on what is happening in intel-
lectual property. Even if they refuse to play the game, they may be un-
wittingly infringing someone else's patents because there are so many
more of them around. Unless firms have patents of their own to assert so
they can reach a cross-licensing agreement (often with money changing
hands too), they will be in trouble. Thus many companies are acquiring
large numbers of patents for purely defensive reasons, for use only to
keep others' patent threats at bay.
Id.
75 For a list of intellectual property settlements, damages awarded, and li-
censes, see Gregory Aharonian, Patent/copyright infringement lawsuits/licensing
awards, available at http://www.patenting-art.com/economic/awards.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2006).
76 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634-MA, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 344 (D. Mass. 1991) (awarding $873,158,971); NTP Inc. v. Research in
Motion Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2003) (issuing an order that eventually
awarded NTP more than $26m in damages); Eolas Technologies. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 99 C 626, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 522 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (awarding
$520,562,280).
77 Eolas and NTP were both sent back to their respective District Courts by
the Federal Circuit.
78 See supra Section 1.4.
79 Cf Huston, supra note 11 (finding corporate managerial dedication to pat-
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guably promotes increased R&D expenditures with a concomitant
increase in patent procurement.
8°
2.1. The Semiconductor Industry as a Case Study
There are at least some industries, however, that do not seem to
make rational decisions regarding their patent portfolios. For ex-
ample, in the U.S. semiconductor industry, numerous surveys and
studies have shown that semiconductor firms rely more on trade
secrets than on their patent portfolios in order to protect their IP.81
Nevertheless, the same studies and surveys have shown that the
semiconductor industry continues to procure patents at a fervent
pace.82 Hall and Ziedonis have theorized that this apparent "pat-
ent paradox" may be explained, at least in part, by the proliferation
of so-called "patent thickets" in the U.S. semiconductor industry.
83
They explain that the semiconductor industry produces so-called
"cumulative"8 4 technologies, where new advancements are built on
the shoulders of the previous technologies. Accordingly, "semi-
conductor firms often require access to a 'thicket' of IP rights in or-
der to advance the technology or to legally produce or sell their
products."85 In order to obtain access to the "thicket," semiconduc-
tor firms must amass their own thicket of patents to use as a bar-
gaining chip for exchange. 8
6
The patent activities of semiconductor and other high-
technology firms in the United States can be compared to those of
the EU in order to determine whether there are any jurisdictional
differences in patent portfolio management (i.e., litigation and pro-
curement for the purposes of this paper) in the semiconductor in-
dustry. In particular, three of the top semiconductor firms in each
ent litigation even in bad economic times).
80 Cf. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 140 (2000) ("[Sitronger patents would induce further R&D, patent ap-
plications, and patent exploitation.").
81 See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revis-
ited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995,
32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 101-25 (2001), available at http://www.je.org/abstract
s/abstracts/2001/rjeSpring'01 Hall.pdf (analyzing and explaining the "patent
paradox" in the U.S. semiconductor industry).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 102.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 125.
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jurisdiction may serve as exemplary case studies. In Europe, these
three semiconductor firms include Infineon Technologies, Philips
Semiconductors, and STMicroelectronics. 8 7 In the United States,
they are Micron, Texas Instruments, and Intel.88
The three European firms hold a combined total of approxi-
mately 35,000 patents in Europe.8 9 The U.S. firms hold a combined
total of approximately 37,000 patents in the United States.90 It
should be noted that there are more U.S. semiconductor firms than
European ones, however, and even the European Semiconductor
Industry (a trade group) has identified certain weaknesses in their
industry.91
Breaking down the total number of utility patents filed for in-
ventions classified under either "Physics" or "Electricity," which
presumably substantially covers the breadth of patents for the
semiconductor industry, we see that the number of such applica-
tions filed in the USPTO from the years 1996 to 2003 also domi-
nates, more than tripling the number filed in the EPO in 2003 (see
Figure 8 below). The total number of "high-technology" patent fil-
ings in the USPTO is also greater than in the EPO, more than quad-
rupling the number of "high-technology" patents filed in the EPO
in 2003 (see Figure 9 below).
Patent litigation statistics were not parsed by industry, 92 but it
87 See, e.g., Press Release, Philips Semiconductors, Top Three European Semi-
conductor Manufacturers Announce Initiative to Eliminate Lead from Semicon-
ductor Products (July 12, 2001), available at http://www.semiconductors.
philips.com/news/content/file-728.htn-l) (dubbing Infineon, Philips, and STM as
the top three European semiconductor manufacturers). For more general informa-
tion, see the company websites of Infineon (http://www.infineon.com), Philips
(http://www.semiconductors.philips.com), and STM (http://www.st.com).
88 These three companies were chosen as a random sampling of charter
members of the Semiconductor Industry Association (http://www.sia-online.org
/memlist.cfm). For more general information, see the company websites of Intel
(http://www.intel.com), Micron (http://www.micron.com), and Texas Instru-
ments (http://www.ti.com).
89 This data was obtained by running a patentee search on http://ep.espace
net.com/search97cgi/s97_cgi.exe?Action=FormGen&Template=ep/en/home.hts.
90 This data was obtained by running a patentee search on http://patft.uspto
.gov/netahtml/PTO/ search-adv.htm.
91 See, e.g., The European Semiconductor Industry Association, The European
Semiconductor Industry: 2005 Competitiveness Report 4, Executive Summary,
available at http://www.eeca.org/pdf/final-comp-report-exec-summary.pdf
(2005) (noting that "the EU lacks a dedicated sectoral approach to supporting [the
semiconductor] industry").
92 In other words, the statistics presented in this Comment do not indicate the
number of patent cases filed or decided by players in the semiconductor industry
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would be reasonable to assume, based on the findings vis-A-vis
patent procurement, 93 that there is more high-technology patent
litigation in the United States than in the EU, given the much
higher number of patent litigation cases in the United States.94
FIGURE 8. "PHYSICS/ELECTRICITY" PATENT FILINGS BY YEAR.
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versus the information technologies industry versus the consumer electronics in-
dustry, for example.
93 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
95 Trilateral Statistical Report, supra note 33.
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FIGURE 9. "HIGH-TECHNOLOGY" PATENT FILINGS BY YEAR. 96
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3. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND FINAL THOUGHTS
While not considered in this Comment, looking forward, it is
clear that increased globalization will play a greater role in mana-
gerial decision-making and corporate strategies regarding patent
activities.97 Companies in the United States, for example, may seek
monopolistic rents on their patents not just domestically, but
abroad, by filing PCT applications on domestic IP in order to ob-
tain patents in foreign jurisdictions. The collection of rents abroad
would allow companies to recoup even more losses in economic
downturns.98 This would also serve, essentially, as a foreign sub-
sidy to domestic public spending in R&D. 99
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., C. P. Rao & Jerome Witt, The Interface between Global Sourcing and
Marketing, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 98, 102 (C. P. Rao
ed., 2001) (describing "global sourcing strategy" as "a partial corporate strategy
aimed at the worldwide utilization of material resources").
98 I.e., there would be a greater market of potential infringers.
99 I.e., public spending on R&D will produce patents that may be asserted in
foreign jurisdictions, thereby exogenously recouping costs. This also explains, at
1100 [Vol. 27:4
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Ultimately, however, the idea is that globalization will lead to
harmonization of the patent laws across nations, inherently result-
ing in an increase in innovation and technological advancement on
a global level. At such a time, the analysis undertaken in this
Comment should shift to an observation of patent procurement
and litigation vis-A-vis the global economy, rather than individual
national economies. However, IP rights have traditionally been
viewed as drivers of national economic wealth creation. In a glob-
alized world having harmonized patent laws and a uniform econ-
omy, individual nations would have an incentive to provide cer-
tain quirks and wrinkles in patent protection to induce arbitrage by
patentees in their favor. This view of the future can either advo-
cate for or against patent policy harmonization.
The incentive to providing opportunities for IP arbitrage is also
somewhat of a twist on the tragedy of the commons, as nations will
always want to be at the forefront of innovation, but will have their
hands tied by harmonized patent laws. Accordingly, it may be that
nations with strong IP rights will not only choose to side against
harmonization, but they may also opt to compete with each other
for increasingly stronger IP rights.100
Nations with strong IP rights101 would nevertheless have an in-
centive to harmonize amongst each other, so that their domestic
R&D spending may be subsidized by similarly wealthy foreign na-
tions who would otherwise use the technologies at no cost. This
may precipitate the formation of even more tightly knit trade
groups among the industrialized nations (who may accept patent
harmonization within the group, but not globally), which would
necessarily increase the inequality gap with third world countries.
These are all issues left for future consideration.
least partly, the push for harmonization of patent laws across borders, making it
easier to obtain protection in multiple jurisdictions.
100 The competition will be within reason, of course, as it has been shown that
"patent thickets" can actually discourage innovation. See, e.g., Rosemarie Ham
Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, 180, 209 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill
eds., 2003) (discussing "patent thickets").
101 Such nations may include the United States, European Union Member Na-
tions, and Japan, for example.
1101
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